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Quote: "In the past decade, worldwide 
more than 1.5 million children have 
been killed in wars; more than 4 million 
haw been physically disabled and some 
5 million are now in refugee camps; 12 
million have lost their homes; and un- 
told numbers-but they reach into the 
millions-have been psychologically 
tm~matized."~ 
A l'kchelle mondiale au cours de la 
derniare ddcennie, plus de 1.5 million 
d'enfants ont kt4 t&s dans des conflits 
a d s ;  plus de 4 millions ont subi un 
handicap physique et environ 5 millions 
rksident prdsentement dans des camps 
de rtfugiks; 12 millions sont sans abri; 
et un nombre indkfini-mais qui se 
chifie aussi en millions-ont subi des 
traumatisrnes psychologiques. 
C hildren have been assassinated for political activities? cap tured and enslaved by rival 
ethnic groups, subjected to torture, 
rape and the destruction of their farni- 
lies.3 Persecution of children is an enor- 
mous problem in the world today and 
children are more vulnerable to the 
devastating effects of persecution be- 
cause they experience such trauma as 
children without the defences built up 
by the maturation process. 
Most of the world's children who 
are in danger of persecution do not 
reach Canada, and most of those who 
do come, arrive with parents and are 
dealt with in the context of their par- 
ents' refugee claims. However, grow- 
ing numbers of unaccompanied 
refugee children are now appearing 
before the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB) to make refugee claims.4 
The only legislative protections for 
such claimants in our refugee determi- 
nation process is the requirement that 
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the Board appoint a "designated rep- 
resentative" for refugee claimants un- 
der eighteen5 The Board has recently 
published guidelines to increase pro- 
cedural protections for refugee chil- 
dren.6 However, the Board has not yet 
tackled the substantive issues of what 
constitutes a well-founded fear of per- 
secution for child claimants and how 
the Convention grounds for fear of 
persecution may be applied to cases 
involving child claimants. I shall focus 
here on a substantive approach to refu- 
gee claims by minors and recommend 
guidelines to be followed in address- 
ing the difficult evidenciary issues 
sometimes raised by such claims. 
What Constitutes 'Tersecution" of 
Children 
A "Convention refugee" must estab- 
lish that s/he has a "well-founded fear 
of persecution for reasons of race, reli- 
gion, nationality, membership in a par- 
ticular social group or political 
opinion. "' As the UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status states, "[tlhere is no uni- 
versally accepted definition of "perse- 
cution," and various attempts to 
formulate such a definition have met 
with little ~uccess."~ Furthermore, the 
jurisprudence on the meaning of "per- 
secution" has developed in the context 
of claims made by adults. 
In determining the refugee claims of 
children, the Board should consider 
first the nature of harm that could con- 
stitute "persecution" of children. Just 
as there are types of persecution 
"unique to women,'r9 there may also 
be types of persecution unique to 
childhood. Harmful actions that might 
be considered as mere harassment or 
discrimination in the case of an adult, 
may constitute persecution when ap- 
plied to children. Children have differ- 
ent basic needs, are more vulnerable 
and have fewer defences against 
abuse. For example, depriving an adult 
of an opportunity to attend school may 
not be seen as persecution. However, 
depriving a child of the right to attend 
school (for "Convention" reasons) 
could easily be seen as persecutory. 
Separation of the child from parents 
may be persecutory, whereas separa- 
tion of adults from their parents is 
something that occurs normally and 
would not usually be thought of as a 
persecutory act. Participation in the 
workforce and forced conscription are 
perhaps the most obvious examples of 
treatment that may be persecutory for 
children but would not usually be per- 
secutory for adults. Abusive acts such 
as beating or torture, may have more 
severe consequences for children (and 
therefore be more persecutory) than 
similar treatment of an adult. Simi- 
larly, threats of abuse made to a child 
may be more harmful and frightening 
than in the case of an adult who might 
be better able to determine the likeli- 
hood of the threat being carried out. 
In approaching the issue of what 
constitutes persecution of children, it 
might be helpful to substitute "chil- 
dren'' for "women" in some passages 
of the Board's Guidelines on Women 
Refugee Claimants. For example: 
The social, cultural, traditional and 
religious norms and the laws affect- 
ing . . . [children] in the claimant's 
country of origin ought to be as- 
sessed by reference to human rights 
instruments which provide a frame- 
work of international standards for 
recognizing the protection needs of 
. . . [children]. What constitutes per- 
missible conduct by a state towards 
... [children] may be determined, 
therefore, by reference to interna- 
tional instruments. 
The most important of these "interna- 
tional instruments" to be consulted 
when assessing the situation of refu- 
gee children should be the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.lo 
The Federal Court has indicated in 
some recent decisions that the perse- 
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cution faced by a child, even if accom- 
panied by an adult, is important to the 
claim as a whole, and that the Conven- 
tion on the Rights of the Child is relevant 
to the determination of refugee status 
of children. In Sahota v. M.E;L,'l Mr. 
Justice McKeown returned the case of 
a 16-year-old Sikh boy for redetermi- 
nation by the Board. He stated that the 
consideration of an internal flight al- 
ternative might be unreasonable in 
view of theapplicant's age. He also stated 
that the new panel of the Board should 
consider the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, in the redetermination hear- 
ing. In another case, Mr. Justice 
Muldoon determined that the particu- 
lar vulnerability of the four children of 
the adult claimants was one of the fac- 
tors the Board had ignored in deciding 
the case. He stated: 
. . . in the last analysis, the Court re- 
gards the children as being of impor- 
tance. and the Board seemed to 
neglect them and their probable vul- 
nerability to any untoward act of rac- 
ism or dkcrimkation or harassment 
or persecution on the part of those 
who control the territory where they 
will be living in Sri Lanka if they re- 
turn to Sri Lanka.12 
In a case decided by Madame Justice 
Reed involving a mother and daughter 
from Sri Lanka, the Court stated: 
The Board in reaching its decision 
that the applicant was not likely to be 
persecuted in Colombo focussed al- 
most exclusively on the applicant's 
situation . . . The Board focussed its 
attention on the position of the appli- 
cant, particularly her age, and did not 
assess the likelihood of the children 
being the subject of persecution. I 
think this is the error which dictates 
that the Board's decision must be set 
aside.13 
Assessing the nature of harm that con- 
stitutes persecution for children is not 
an attempt to lower the threshold of 
the definition of Convention refugee 
to accommodate children. Rather, 
"persecution" must be recognized as a 
relative term. Thus the Board must as- 
sess the harm feared in the context of 
the special vulnerability of children 
and the potential consequences of the 
harm feared to a particular child at that 
time in the child's life, in order to de- 
termine whether the harm feared con- 
stitutes persecution. 
Nexus to the Convention Grounds 
Political Opinion 
A "Convention refugee," as defined by 
the Immigration Act, must establish a 
"well-founded fear of persecution by 
reason of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion."14 The Con- 
vention grounds for fear of persecu- 
tion due to race, religion and 
nationality may as easily apply to chil- 
dren as to adults. However, the Board 
may be more hesitant to find that a 
child has a political opinion (or that s/ 
he is perceived to have a political opin- 
ion) that could result in persecution. 
In the case of a young Chilean 
woman whose claim was turned down 
by R.S.A.C.15 in 1980, the decision mak- 
ers could not believe that as a twelve or 
from which they have come in order to 
properly determine political opinion 
or perceived political opinion in these 
claims. Furthermore, objective evi- 
dence of treatment accorded to simi- 
larly situated children will often 
constitute the most important evi- 
dence as to whether the claim is well- 
founded since minor claimants may 
not be able to provide satisfactory evi- 
dence of their own particular situation. 
Membership in a Particular Social 
Group 
The ground for fear of persecution of 
many child claimants willbe member- 
ship in the "particular social group" of 
their own family. In most cases of ac- 
companied minors, this is the ground 
upon which the child's claim is 
founded. With few exceptions, if the 
parents are found to be refugees, the 
children are also determined to be 
refugees in their own right and if the 
parents are refused, the children are 
also refused. In the Board's reasons 
. . .the Board must assess the harm feared in the context of the special 
vulnerability of children and the potential consequences of the harm 
feared to a particular child at that time in the child's life, in order tb 
determine whether the harm feared constitutes persecution. 
thirteen-year-old in Chile, this claim- 
ant would have been perceived as a 
threat to the Chilean regime. They con- 
cluded, therefore, that it was not plau- 
sible that she had been persecuted as 
she described.16 This was a "crosscul- 
tural communication" problem. The 
decision makers were inappropriately 
applying their perceptions about a 
child's possible political involvement, 
based on their knowledge of Canadian 
children, to the Chileancontext. In fact, 
in many parts of the world, children 
are political activists or may be per- 
ceived as such by their oppressors. The 
case of Iqbal Masih, a Pakistani child 
who was a crusader against child-la- 
bour in the carpet factories, is a recent 
well-publicized example of this.17 
In determining refugee claims of 
minors, the Board should obtain docu- 
mentary evidence specific to children 
in the cultural and political context 
(usually not written in the case of posi- 
tive determinations), the Board may 
comment that the children's claims 
were based on their parents' claim and 
that, accordingly, they are also found 
to be Convention refugees. 
In some cases the Board may men- 
tion the "principle of family unity."18 
Unfortunately, the "principle of fam- 
ily unity," which was a recommenda- 
tion in the Final Act of the Conference 
that adopted the 1951 Convention, was 
not incorporated in the definition of 
"Convention refugee," and the Federal 
Court has found that this important 
principle is not a mandatory consid- 
eration in making a determination of 
refugee status.19 
Although in the past the Board has 
usually included accompanied chil- 
dren in either the positive (or negative) 
decision on their parents' claims, re- 
cently some Board members have 
Refuge, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1996) 
denied claims of dependant minor 
children, even when one or both par- 
ents have been found to be Convention 
refugees. The rationale for this seems 
to be that the determination of refugee 
status should be as narrow as possible 
and that appropriate immigration pro- 
visions exist for allowing the depend- 
ants of Convention refugees to be 
granted permanent resident status as 
members of the family of the Conven- 
tion refugee parents. In these cases, the 
Board has found that the children 
(sometimes the children and the 
spouse) only fear "indirect persecu- 
tion." Although the children will be 
"indirectly" harmed by the persecu- 
tion of their parent(s)-this is not 
found to be adequate to establish the 
child as a Convention refugee in his/ 
her own right. There is a concern that 
including persons who fear indirect 
persecution "unjustifiably broadens" 
the Convention refugee definition2O 
The Trial Division of the Federal 
Court is somewhat divided on this is- 
sue and the Federal Court of Appeal 
has yet to pronounce itself definitively 
on either the issues of "indirect perse- 
cution" or the "principle of family 
unity."21 In my view, the better posi- 
tion being taken by the Federal Court 
is that enunciated by Mr. Justice 
Jerome in the case of Bha tti v. The Secre- 
tary of State of Canada. The Associate 
Chief Justice reviewed the Canadian 
case law on "indirect persecution" and 
the references to "indirect persecu- 
tion" made by Atle Grahl-Madsen in 
The Status of Refugees in International 
LawIZZ and stated as follows: 
The concept of indirect persecution 
is premised on the assumption that 
family members are likely to suffer 
great harm when their close relatives 
arepersecuted. This harmmay mani- 
fest itself in many ways ranging from 
the loss of the victim's economic and 
social support to the psychological 
trauma associated with witnessing 
the suffering of loved ones.= 
The new restrictive approach being 
taken to the "principle of family unity" 
and the denial of refugee claims based 
on "indirect persecution" threatens the 
protection needs of refugee children. 
As an immigration law practitioner, I 
recognize the problems that depend- 
ant childrenmight encounter if they do 
not have a determination of refugee 
status in their own right. For example, 
the child might be inadmissible as an 
immigrant on medical or other 
grounds, or the Convention refugee 
parent might be found to be inadmissi- 
ble for some reason, thus placing the 
minor dependants in a situation of 
inability to acquire permanent resi- 
dent status due to the parent's 
inadmissibility. 
More important, such reasoning 
disregards the fact that parental care is 
a basic human right of a child. Accord- 
ing to Article 7 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 
The child shall be registered imrnedi- 
ately after birth and shall have the 
right from birth to a name, the right 
to acquire a nationality and, as far as 
possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents." 
Thus, to find that the removal of a par- 
ent (through death or imprisonment), 
or the severe harm to a parent (by tor- 
ture, rape, etc.), is not persecutory of 
the child, fails to recognize the child's 
right to parental care as an essential 
human right, affecting the very sur- 
vival of the child, and being crucial to 
the child's normal development. 
It would be interesting to query 
whether the same Board members who 
consider the torture of a parent to con- 
stitute "indirect persecution" of the 
child, would find that torture or kid- 
napping of an adult claimant's child 
(or the threat thereof) is not persecu- 
tory of the adult, but is merely "indi- 
rect persecution" and therefore not a 
sufficient basis for a well-founded fear 
of persecution. I have dealt with many 
cases of adult refugee claimants whose 
claims were based on the threats of 
harm to their spouses and/or children. 
This is a well-known method used by 
repressive states to exert pressure on 
opponents. It appears that there is a 
double standard operating here, 
which I would relate to a subc~nscious 
perception that children are posses- 
sions of their parents rather than per- 
sons in their own right. Thus it is 
perdeivehs persecutory of the parent 
if his/her child (possession) is taken 
away or harmed but only indirect per- 
secution of the child if the parent is 
taken away or harmed. 
Rather than attempting to classify 
"persecution" as indirect or direct, it 
makes more sense to recognize, as 
some of the jurisprudence has already 
done, that persecution of a person's 
close family members may also consti- 
tute persecution of the person him or 
herself. Thus persecution of the child's 
parent/s or siblings may also consti- 
tute persecution of the child and vice 
versa.25 
Furthermore, it is not diluting or 
broadening the application of the refu- 
gee Convention to find that children's 
kinship ties to persecuted parents or 
other relatives bring them within the 
"particular social group" of the family 
and that their well-founded fear of loss 
of those kinship ties constitutes a well- 
founded fear of persecution. Member- 
ship in the particular social group of 
one's family as the nexus to the Con- 
vention definition, is already solidly 
grounded in the Canadian jurispru- 
dence. In Canada v. Ward, the Supreme 
Court proposed three possible catego- 
ries of "particular social group" in the 
context of the Convention definition 
and the first of these is ". . . groups de- 
fined by an innate or unchangeable 
characteristic . . ." 
Membership in a family is clearly an 
"innate or unchangeable characteris- 
tic." In coming to its conclusions as to 
the meaning of "particular social 
group," the Supreme Court quoted 
with approval this passage from the 
U.S. decision in Matter of Acos ta: 
Applying the doctrine of ejusdern 
generis, we interpret the phrase "per- 
secution on account of membership 
in a particular social group" to mean 
persecution that is directed toward 
an individual who is a member of a 
group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic. 
The shared characteristic might be an 
innate one such as sex, color, or kin- 
ship ties . . . 26 
The elaboration of the term "particular 
social group" in Ward to include 
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kinship ties, follows long-established 
recognition of membership in one's 
family as the basis for a well-founded 
fear of persecution by reason of "par- 
ticular social group" in the jurispru- 
dence of the IRB and its predecessor, 
the Immigration Appeal Board.27 
To ensure the protection needs of 
refugee children, whether accompa- 
nied or unaccompanied, the Board 
should provide guidelines strongly 
recommending adherence by decision 
makers to the "principle of family 
unity," as set out in the UNHCR Hand- 
book, and indicating that so-called "in- 
direct persecution," particularly when 
it deals with the persecution of parents 
or primary care-givers, can be the basis 
of a refugee claim for children on the 
Convention ground of "membership 
in a particular social group." 
Age-specific Persecution 
In addition to the particular social 
group of the family, children may be in 
danger of persecution because they are 
children. The examples of "street 
kids,"28 child prostitutes, child brides, 
female genital mutilation, child slav- 
ery, and forced conscription of chil- 
dren come to mind. Just as in the 
situation of gender-defined persecu- 
tion, the fact that there might be large 
numbers of the minor population in a 
particular country who are in this situ- 
ation is irrelevant. The fact that the 
children's own parents may be in- 
volved in causing the persecutory 
treatment is also irrelevant because, if 
this is the case, the state is under a 
greater responsibility to intervene. 
One might again refer to the Board's 
Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants, 
and apply these guidelines to the situ- 
ation of children: 
What is relevant is evidence that the 
particular social group suffers or 
fears to suffer discrimination or 
harsh and inhuman treatment that is 
distinguished from the situation of 
the general population or from 
other ... [children]. A subgroup of ... 
[children] may be identified by refer- 
ence to their exposure or vulnerabil- 
ity for physical, cultural or other 
reasons to violence, including do- 
mestic violence, in an environment 
that denies them protection. These ... 
[children] face violence amounting 
to persecution because of their par- 
ticular vulnerability as . . . [children] 
in their societies and because they are 
so unpr~tected.~~ 
In order to deal with claims by refugee 
children based on their membership in 
the particular social group of unpro- 
tected children, the Board must obtain 
evidence on the status of children in 
the particular country involved, such 
as the child welfare legislation of that 
country, the measures that have been 
adopted to protect vulnerable chil- 
dren, and, whether such measures are 
truly effective. 
Evidenciary Issues 
In dealing with the claims of unaccom- 
panied refugee children, the most dif- 
ficult issue has often been obtaining 
sufficient evidence to establish a well- 
founded fear of persecution. On the 
oped than that of an adult. Just as we 
would cringe at the thought of pitting 
a 250 Ib. adult male against a 70 lb. boy 
in a physical fight, we should recog- 
nize that children are not equipped to 
spar with the intellectual and verbal 
skills of adults in the hearing room. 
This is true even for children who are 
able to converse intelligently and who 
appear mature in many respects. The 
result of this incapacity to testify may 
be that the child is unable to provide 
the necessary evidence in support of 
his or her own claim. 
Most of the Federal Court decisions 
on refugee claims by unaccompanied 
minors concern refusals by the Board 
based on lack of credibility of the mi- 
nor claimant.30 Such decisions are par- 
ticularly difficult to overturn at the 
Federal Court because it is presumed 
that the Board is in the best possible 
position to judge the credibility of the 
claimant before them. To avoid erro- 
Just as we would cringe at the thought of pMng a 250 lb. adult male 
against a 70 lb. boy in a physical fight, we should recognize that chil- 
dren are not equipped to spar with the intellectual and verbal skills of 
adults in the hearing room. This is true even for children who are able 
to converse intelligently and who appear mature in many respects. 
one hand, the right of children to par- 
ticipate in a decision affecting their 
rights must be affirmed. However, the 
children may not themselves be capa- 
ble of providing the necessary evi- 
dence. This may be obvious, as when 
the child is two years old, or it may 
require a careful professional assess- 
ment, if the child is over seven years 
old. 
Furthermore, the techniques for de- 
termining credibility in the case of 
adults must be significantly altered in 
order to treat a child or adolescent 
claimant fairly. Cross-examination 
techniques used to determine credibil- 
ity of adult claimants are simply not 
fair to children or adolescents who 
have different and varying percep- 
tions of time, chronology, and the rela- 
tive importance of facts and details, 
and whose ability to understand ques- 
tions and articulate responses even in 
their own language is much less devel- 
neous decisions on credibility of minor 
claimants, the Board needs the assist- 
ance of clear guidelines as to fair proce- 
dures in dealing with the testimony of 
minors. In many cases, as indicated 
above, there should be no attempt to 
examine the child directly and greater 
reliance should be placed on objective 
evidence provided by alternate 
sources. Furthermore, there should be 
no attempt to cross-examine a child 
claimant who has given oral testimony 
as this would almost inevitably result 
in unfairness. 
Objective Evidence and the "Benefit 
of the Doubt" 
Once a determination has been made 
(by the child's representative and the 
child's counsel) that the child is inca- 
pable of testifying or that the child's 
best interests would not be served by 
having the child testify, other sources 
of information concerning the child's 
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situation should be prepared for the 
Board such as the testimony of wit- 
nesses, expert evidence, documentary 
evidence concerning similarly situated 
children and general country condi- 
tions relevant to the claim. Once this 
objective evidence has been gathered, 
then the Board should proceed to a 
determination of the claim guided by 
the recommendation of the UNHCR 
Handbook: " . . . having a greater regard 
for certain objective factors, consider- 
ing the circumstances of the parents 
and other family members, and allow- 
ing for the liberal application of the 
benefit of the doubt."31 
The UNHCR Handbook has been rec- 
ognized by the courts in Canada as a 
persuasive authority. The Supreme 
Court, in the decisions of Ward and 
Chan has reiterated the importance of 
reference to the UNHCR Handbook for 
the proper interpretation of the Con- 
vention refugee definition. J. La Forest 
stated for the Court in Ward, as follows: 
While not formally binding on signa- 
tory states, the Handbook has been 
endorsed by the states which are the 
members of the Executive Conunit- 
tee of the UNHCR, including 
Canada, and has been relied upon by 
the courts of signatory states.32 
If doubt remains, for example, if the 
Board is not satisfied with evidence 
from other family members about the 
situation of the child and there is little 
or no documentary evidence about 
similarly situated children, the hearing 
should be adjourned to seek further 
evidence. The most disturbing deci- 
sions by Board members have been the 
ones in which the Board determined 
that there was no reliable evidence 
upon which they could find that the 
child's fear of persecution was well- 
founded and then determined the 
child not to be a Convention refugee. 
This result is particularly unaccept- 
able if the child comes from a country 
with a high acceptance rate for refugee 
claims. For example, in a case decided 
by the Board in May of 1993, anine year 
old Tamil boy was determined not to 
be a Convention refugee because, al- 
though his testimony regarding his 
detention in Colombo was credible, it 
was obvious that he had been coached 
about some of his evidence and the 
Board therefore gave his evidence lit- 
tle weight. Then "faced with a total 
lack of evidence surrounding key 
events" of the claim, the Board found 
the claimant had not discharged his 
burden of showing a well-founded 
fear of persecution and determined 
that he was not a Convention refu- 
gee.33 Yet in many successful refugee 
claims from Sri Lanka, the only factor 
necessary to establish the claims was 
to show that the claimant was a "young 
Tamil male," and therefore a member 
of a "particular social group" whose 
members have a well-founded fear of 
persecution according to overwhelm- 
ing objective documentary evidence of 
persecution of such persons. One must 
therefore question why this nine-year- 
old Tamil child was not given the ben- 
efit of the5 doubt as the UNHCR 
Handbook recommends. At the very 
least, in light of the obvious vulnerabil- 
ity of the claimant, and in light of the 
inadequacy of the designated repre- 
sentative who was found not to be 
credible, the hearing should have been 
declared a nullity and sent for redeter- 
mination to another panel with a new 
representative. 
Conclusion 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
states in its preamble as follows: 
Recalling that, in the Universal Dec- 
laration of Human Rights, the 
United Nations has proclaimed 
that childhood is entitled to special 
care and assistance . . . 
Bearing in mind that the need to 
extend particular care to the child 
has been stated in the Geneva Dec- 
laration of the Rights of the Child of 
1924 ... 
Bearing in mind that, as indicated 
in the Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child, "the child, by reason of 
his physical and mental immatu- 
rity, needs special safeguards and 
care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after 
birth. 
Furthermore, Article 22 of the Conven- 
tion deals particularly with the obliga- 
tions of States Parties with regard to 
children who are seeking refugee sta- 
tus, whether accompanied or unac- 
companied, and states that they shall 
take appropriate measures to ensure 
that such children, ". . . receive appro- 
priate protection and humanitarian 
assistance in the enjoyment of applica- 
ble rights set forth in the present Con- 
vention and in other international 
human rights or humanitarian instru- 
ments ..." 
Refugee children cannot rely on dis- 
cretionary humanitarian remedies, 
that vary from state to state, to provide 
them with the necessary legal protec- 
tion against refoulement and the at- 
tendant settlement rights in their 
country of refuge. The 1951 refugee 
Convention is the specific humanitar- 
ian instrument designed to protect all 
refugees from refoulement, including 
refugee children. Other immigration 
provisions, such as the "humanitarian 
and compassionate" application un- 
der section 114(2) of Canada's Immigra- 
tion Act, are highly discretionary 
remedies, subject to politically moti- 
vated change and inconsistent imple- 
mentation by the immigration 
bureaucracy. Thus the right of children 
to be granted Convention refugee sta- 
tus, and to access the legal protection 
provided by the refugee Convention, 
must be clearly and emphatically reaf- 
firmed. 
In the IRB1s new procedural guide- 
lines on Unaccompanied Refugee 
Children, it is encouraging to note that 
both the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the UNHCR Handbook on Pro- 
cedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status, are quoted with ap- 
proval. One might hope that with the 
implementation of procedural guide- 
lines, with special training for Board 
members who are selected to deal with 
child claimants, and with the develop- 
ment of positive jurisprudence on the 
substantive issues of refugee law as it 
applies to children, the refugee claims 
of children will be recognized as mer- 
iting the particular concern and special 
care consistent with the sentiments 
expressed in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. If further guidelines 
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are implemented to address the sub- 
stantive issues of claims by refugee 
children, Canada may once again pro- 
vide leadership in an uncharted area of 
refugee law as we have with the Guide- 
lines for Women Refugee Claimants. 
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